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Some workers bargain with prospective employers before accepting a job. Others could 
bargain, but find it undesirable, because their right to bargain has induced a sufficiently 
favorable offer, which they accept. Yet others perceive that they cannot bargain over pay; 
they regard the posted wage as a take-it-or-leave-it opportunity. Theories of wage formation 
point to substantial differences in labor-market equilibrium between bargained and posted 
wages. The fraction of workers hired away from existing jobs is another key determinant of 
equilibrium, because a worker with an existing job has a better outside option in bargaining 
than does an unemployed worker. Our survey measures the incidences of wage posting, 
bargaining, and on-the-job search. We find that about a third of workers had precise 
information about pay when they first met with their employers, a sign of wage posting. We 
find that another third bargained over pay before accepting their current jobs. And about 40 
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Labor is one of the most heterogeneous products traded in a modern economy. The compet-
itive market for a commodity, where all units are interchangeable and all trade for the same
price, could hardly be a worse description of the labor market. No Walrasian auctioneer
determines the wage. We describe survey evidence on the ways that an employer and a
worker determine the wage at the outset of their relationship.
The extensive literature on this topic considers two main cases. The rst is wage posting.
Here an employer denes a job in terms of duties and qualications, and commits to a wage.
If a candidate is found qualied and interested, the employer oers the wage on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis. The second is bargaining. The employer makes an initial oer, but the
candidate can make a counteroer for a higher wage, if so inclined. A key dierence between
the two modes is the employer's commitment not to entertain a counteroer.
In the United States, a small fraction of workers in private employment and a larger
fraction in government employment receive pay under the terms of collective bargaining
agreements. From the point of view of an individual worker, the resulting wage is posted
rather than bargained individually. We identify unionized and government workers in our
analysis of the survey data.
In addition to wage posting and bargaining, one could imagine a labor market where
employers can commit to ignore counteroers, on the one hand, but make a custom oer
to the applicant rather than oering the same wage to all qualied applicants, on the other
hand. This market would encounter the Diamond paradox. An employer would make an
oer that just meets a worker's reservation wage. The worker knows that the wage is below
the maximum that would be acceptable to the employer, but also knows that the employer
will not consider a counteroer that is below that maximum but better than the employer's
original oer. The worker will accept the original oer. The only equilibrium in the labor
market under these conditions is for workers to earn the bare minimum needed to attract
them to the market. Workers would not earn the Ricardian rents that normally make up a
substantial fraction of wages. We will discuss this point in the next section.
Wage formation has a central role in the theory of unemployment. A positive level of
unemployment is inevitable given the frictions in the labor market|some workers will always
be in the process of locating a better use for their services after a decline in their value at
an earlier job. The anticipated wage determines the payo to workers to search for new jobs
2and to employers to recruit new workers.
Our survey has about 1400 respondents who took a job suciently recently that we
believe that their answers about wage formation at the beginning of the job were reasonably
reliable. In addition to many questions about their backgounds, we asked four questions
that bear specically on wage formation. The rst determined how much a respondent knew
about pay before being interviewed for the job. This question bears on the public nature
of the wage in a wage-posting market. The second asked if the wage oer for the current
job was take-it-or-leave-it or if bargaining occurred. The third asked if the respondent could
have kept an existing job at the time he or she took the current job. The option to keep an
existing job is valuable in a bargaining setting. The fourth asked if the employer learned the
respondent's earlier pay rate during the evaluation process. This knowledge would improve
the employer's expected benet in a setting with bargaining.
Our results show that both major models of wage formation have important roles in the
U.S. labor market. We nd a fairly high level of knowledge among job-seekers prior to their
job interviews, an indication that public wage posting is important. We conrm that this
information is particularly common among union members and those who took government
jobs. We document a sharply negative relation between education and precise information
about pay|non high-school graduates are almost twice as likely as those with professional
education to know prospective pay exactly. Thus wage posting appears to be much more
important in the less heterogeneous jobs available to those with less education.
We nd that about a third of all workers bargained with their current employers rather
than treating their job oer as take-it-or-leave-it. Bargaining is more common by minority
workers and less common by women. The education gradient for bargaining is remarkably
steep, rising from 26 percent for those who did not graduate from high school to 75 percent
for those with professional degrees. Individual bargaining is rare for union or government
jobs.
The respondents who knew the wage in advance and who understood the wage oer to
be take-it-or-leave-it are the most likely to have taken jobs in a market with posted wages.
We nd that this group is 22 percent of workers if we interpret knowing as knowing exactly
the wage when rst interviewed by the employer and 54 percent if we interpret knowing as
including having a pretty good idea. We view these gures as placing rough bounds on the
incidence of posted wage jobs. We nd that minorities are somewhat less likely to be in
3the posted-wage sector and women more likely. Participation in the posted-wage sector falls
strongly with education. Union members and government workers are highly likely to hold
posted-wage jobs.
We nd that about 39 percent of workers could have kept their earlier jobs at the time
they were considering their current jobs. This gure is essentially the same among those who
bargained for pay and varies only slightly among the categories of respondents. We conclude
that models of on-the-job search are highly relevant for understanding wage formation and
that, for jobs with wage bargaining, the option to stay in the earlier job should have an
important in
uence on the wage bargain.
Finally, we nd that 53 percent of workers reported that their employers had learned their
pay in their earlier jobs before making the oer that led to the current job. This fraction
is slightly higher for jobs where actual wage bargaining occurred. It is about the same in
situations where the respondent could have kept an earlier job. The fraction varies only a
little among categories of workers.
2 Research on Wage Formation
Pissarides (2000), Mortensen (2003), and Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) discuss much
of the relevant research on wage formation for individual workers. In the brief summary in
this section, we will discuss all of the research as if it had originally referred to the labor
market, though a number of important papers were actually stated in terms of product
markets.
Stigler (1961, 1962) launched modern thinking about trade in markets for heterogeneous
products. He observed that, in the presence of variation in wages, a job-seeker should sample
from the distribution of available wages. The choice of the number of samples balances the
benet of nding a higher wage, where the marginal benet falls with sample size, against
the cost of sampling, which is constant. McCall (1970) provided a technical solution to this
problem, based on class notes from Kenneth Arrow. Unemployment depends on the amount
of sampling job-seekers nd optimal.
Diamond (1971) tackled the problem of equilibrium in a search market. He considered
the optimal policy of an employer confronted by searchers who follow the Stigler-McCall
prescription. He observed that, if all other employers set the same wage, one employer
could still hire a random visitor by setting a wage below the common wage, but not so
4far below as to cause the visitor to incur the cost of visiting another employer. This logic
shows that a common wage cannot be an equilibrium in the market, with one exception: the
monopsony wage could be an equilibrium, because the employer, though able to get a lower
wage, would choose not to, as a wage below the monopsony level would yield a lower prot.
Diamond concluded that the only common wage in equilibrium would be the monopsony
wage, a proposition known as the Diamond paradox. In a simple model where hours of
work for those choosing to participate in the labor market are xed at a standard level or
are fairly inelastically supplied, the monopsony wage is the reservation wage that is just
sucient to induce workers to participate in the labor market. This wage level is the value
of some alternative activity available to the job-seeker. If the wages for all jobs for which a
worker is qualied are set in the way Diamond contemplated, the only equilibrium common
wage leaves the worker indierent between work and non-work. That is, the common wage
deprives the worker of all of the Ricardian rents that we normally associate with the labor
market, where the elasticity of supply for most workers is relatively low and the area above
the supply curve describing the rents is correspondingly large. The supply curve is perfectly
elastic at the indierence point, so the area is zero in the Diamond paradox.
The Diamond paradox rests on a strong assumption: The hapless job-seeker cannot strike
back by making a counteroer. The same logic that permits the employer to make a low
oer that is still acceptable applies equally to the job-seeker, whose higher counteroer could
leave the employer better o than not hiring the job-seeker. In the Diamond paradox, the
employer has all of the bargaining power. Somehow the employer has the power to disregard
a counteroer. It is an open question whether disregarding a counteroer is credible. The
general standard for credibility is on-the-spot rationality or subgame perfection. There is
no general answer as a matter of theory to the question of whether an employer holds all
the bargaining power. We regard the wage-formation process that leads to the Diamond
paradox as unrealistic, not because we know that it is impossible for an employer to have
all the bargaining power, but because we believe that wages are well above the indierence
level for many workers.
Butters (1977) responded to Diamond's challenge in a way directly relevant to this paper:
In Butters's model, the employer oers the same wage to all job-seekers, but the job-seekers
dier among themselves with respect to information about other wages, so they have diverse
reservation wages. By failing to customize the oer, the employer gives some of the surplus
5to all but the applicant with a reservation wage equal to the common value of all of the
employer's oers. The Diamond paradox arises from a situation where the wage oered to
each job-seeker is at the reservation level of that person. Butters launched the posted-wage
model that we investigate here. In his model, job-seekers learn randomly about the wages
of some but not all jobs. In equilibrium, the distribution of wages does not collapse to
a single value. Burdett and Judd (1983) extended Butters's and other formulations and
discusses other models that portray heterogeneous reservations wages but a common oered
wage. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) developed a complete equilibrium model of the labor
market along these lines in which the needed heterogeneity arises from job search by employed
workers. Because they retain the option of keeping their current jobs, their reservation wages
are equal to their current wages and are above the common reservation wage of unemployed
job-seekers. Burdett and Mortensen's paper demonstrated the importance of on-the-job
search as a matter of theory. Quantication of its importance has proven dicult, as it
rests on the fraction of workers who retain the option to stay on their current jobs as they
investigate a possible new job. On-the-job search is easy to dene in a model but hard to
measure in practice.
Within posted-wage models, there is an interesting question as to the public information
about wages. Models of directed search give job-seekers partial or complete information
about the terms of employment. The simplest setup of this type, with full information
available for free to all job-seekers about all job openings, collapses to perfect competition.
Rogerson et al. (2005) discusses models where frictions remain.
The other main branch of individual wage-formation theory attributes more symmet-
ric roles to the job-seeker and employer by assuming that they bargain with each other.
Mortensen (1978) and Diamond and Maskin (1979) began this line of thought in the context
of the formation of symmetric pairs. Diamond (1982) applied it to the labor market with
job-seeker-employer matching and wage formation. This literature applied the Nash bargain
in all cases. The modern canon is Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
Nash's development of his eponymous bargain does not tell a story about how the bar-
gainers reach their bargain. Alternating-oer bargaining seems an approach closer to the
way that bargains are actually made in the labor market and elsewhere. Hall and Milgrom
(2008) apply Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1986) version of the alternating-oer
bargaining model to the setting of the Mortensen-Pissarides model (the paper also discusses
6earlier applications of alternating-oer bargaining in the labor market). The convention of
the labor market appears to be that the employer makes the rst oer, just as the seller
in the housing market makes the rst oer in the form of an asking price. But the wage
oer is not a posted wage|the applicant is free to respond with a counteroer, just as the
potential buyer may oer to pay less than the asking price for a house. The parties continue
to exchange oers until the prospective benet from continuing falls short of the cost of
delaying the deal, at which point one side accepts the other's oer and the deal is done.
A key point is that the unique equilibrium of an alternating-oer bargaining process
with full information is for the employer to oer an acceptable wage as the rst oer|one
just at the margin between triggering a counteroer and not triggering one. Thus with
full information, one never observes parties actually making counteroers. One could easily
confuse a posted wage setup with an alternating-oer setup, because in both cases, the
employer would say, \The job pays X. Do you accept it?" and the prospect would just say
yes or no, without a counteroer.
Hall and Milgrom (2008) show a key dierence between the Nash bargain and alternating-
oer bargaining. With Nash, the worker's threat point is to disclaim any match with the
immediate prospective employer and to re-enter the search process to nd another job open-
ing. The value of this threat depends on the tightness of the labor market|the job-seeker's
bargaining position from the Nash perspective is much stronger if the next job prospect is
easy to nd. By contrast, with alternating-oer bargaining, the threat is to delay the for-
mation of the job match. The value of this threat is not diminished when unemployment is
higher. Thus the wage is not as sensitive to unemployment. The paper explains why the
lower sensitivity helps explain the large increases in unemployment that occur in recessions.
With imperfect information, bargaining models become more complicated and prone to
indeterminacy. Hall and Lazear (1984) lay out some of the issues in the setting of individual
wage formation. See Ausubel, Cramton and Deneckere (2002) for a survey and Menzio (2007)
for an application with individual wage formation. Our survey shows that many job-seekers
actively bargain with employers, contrary to the full-information bargaining model, so this
is an appropriate area for further development.
Figure 1 summarizes the types of model of wage formation between individuals and
employers. At the top we put the issue that divides wage posting from bargaining|can



















Figure 1: Models of Wage Formation
bargaining. If so, the second issue is whether the employer can make a customized oer to
the job-seeker that captures all of the surplus from the match. If so, and if the job-seeker
has no opportunities in labor markets where workers share the surplus, workers will be paid
only enough to bring them into the labor market and will enjoy no Ricardian rents. This
condition is the Diamond paradox. If wage oers are not customized and a force such as on-
the-job search causes reasonable heterogeneity in reservation wages among applicants who
will be paid the same wage, the employer's choice of that wage will result in a sharing of the
surplus by all but those with a reservation wage equal to the wage paid.
On the right side of Figure 1, we distinguish between alternating-oer and Nash bargain-
ing.
3 Objectives of the Survey
Our survey makes some progress in improving understanding of the facts underpinning the
two leading types of models of individual wage formation. The most obvious area of in-
vestigation is whether employers post wages which, to the individual, are take-it-or-leave-it
oers, as opposed to engaging in any type of bargaining. We address this directly by asking if
respondents perceived the wage as take-it-or-leave-it, on the one hand, or if they bargained,
on the other hand. In formulating this question we were quite aware that there was an
omitted intermediate case, that, while the oer was not take-it-or-leave-it, the respondent
did not believe that it would be worth the eort to make a counteroer. We regarded this
8as beyond the reach of our survey techniques, though this issue is ripe for reconsideration in
future work.
A second objective is to probe for information known in advance about the wage a job
paid. In the directed search model, respondents would have known the wage before sinking
any cost in applying for a job. We used two standards for assessing this knowledge: we asked
if the respondent knew the pay exactly and if the respondent had a pretty good idea. We
note later that a large fraction of the respondents picked the \pretty good idea" answer and
that future work might benet from an intermediate phrasing.
A third objective is to measure the incidence of on-the-job search. Previous work, such
as Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2008), has tried to answer this question from data on job

ows, but the evidence from that source is at best indirect because it does not report on
the issue of the option to keep the current job that is so central in wage formation theory.
Also, earlier work measures the fraction of hires that came directly from other jobs while in
this paper we measure the fraction of workers with tenure less than 10 years who retained
the option to remain on an earlier job when they were hired. The focus on hires rather than
workers greatly over-weights high-turnover workers, compared to using an approach based on
workers directly. We nd that on-the-job search is quite a bit more important than appears
from Moscarini and Postel-Vinay's work.
A fourth objective is to study the information that employers have about a prospect's
current or recent wage. This information has a key role in bargaining, especially when the
prospect has the option of keeping the job rather than taking a new job with the employer.
Of course, in a survey of workers, we are limited to inquiring about what the worker thinks
the employer knew when the worker was hired.
4 Survey Design
Our survey is part of the Princeton Data Improvement Initiative, a project to develop new
questions for labor force surveys. The questionnaire was patterned after the Current Popula-
tion Survey and included questions on career experience, job tasks, and occupational licens-
ing. We designed a module to assess the prevalence of wage posting and employer-employee
bargaining at the time employees were hired. Based on a focus group, we concluded that
individuals who were hired within the past 10 years could recall how knowledgeable they
were about the pay on their job when they rst interviewed for it, whether the employer
9made a take-it-or-leave-it oer, whether they could have remained on their previous job if
they had wanted to, and whether their employer was aware of their pay on their previous
job prior to making them an oer. Those who were employed at the time of the survey were
asked about their current job (87 percent), and those who were unemployed at the time of
the survey were asked about their last jobs (13 percent). The unemployment rate for the
(weighted) sample as a whole was 5.3 percent.
The survey organization Westat conducted the survey from June 5 to July 20, 2008.
Individuals age 18 or older who were in the labor force were eligible for the survey. A total
of 2,513 individuals were interviewed, 1,435 of whom were hired in the previous 10 years.
Westat used a random digit dial sampling design constructed from a national sampling
frame of residential exchanges. The selected numbers were then called and screened to
identify households with eligible respondents. One respondent was randomly selected from
each eligible household for the interview using the nearest birthday procedure. Up to 15
callbacks were made to try to elicit responses. Some 28 percent of sampled eligible households
agreed to participate in the screening questions, and 64 percent of the selected individuals in
screened households completed the questionnaire. Thus the response rate was 17.9 percent,
using the American Association for Public Opinion Research response rate denition 3 (see
aapor.org/uploads/Standard Denitions 04 08 Final.pdf, p. 35).
Westat developed survey weights to compensate for variation in selection probabilities,
dierential response rates, and possible under-coverage of the sampling frame. The derivation
of the sample weights focused primarily on matching the marginal distributions of the Cur-
rent Population Survey by sex, age, educational attainment, census region, urbanization,
race, Hispanic ethnicity, employment status, and class of employer (private, government,
etc.). See irs.princeton.edu/PDIIMAIN.htm for a detailed description of the derivation of
the sample weights and the questionnaire.
Although the survey response rate is low compared to many government labor force
surveys, it is comparable to that in commercial surveys. Groves and Peytcheva (2008) show
that survey nonresponse rates by themselves are not associated with signicant bias. Low
response rates are a concern when the causes of participation in the survey are correlated
with the survey variables of interest. We do not believe that wage-formation practices from
years earlier would be correlated with survey participation. The response rate was low in
large part because many households declined to participate in the screener questions, which
10did not mention wages or job search at all. Another reason for placing some condence in
the representativeness of our sample is that a standard Mincerian wage regression using data
from the survey closely matched the corresponding regression from the Current Population
Survey. Although we would have preferred a higher response rate, we have no reason to
believe that nonresponse skews our results in favor or against any particular wage formation
model.
5 Findings
5.1 Descriptive logit model
To describe our survey ndings, we use a logit probability model for yes-no variables con-
structed from the respondents' answers. The model predicts the probability of a yes answer,
given a set of variables describing the individual and the job. These variables are
 Indicator for African-American individual
 Indicator for Latino or Latina individual
 Indicator for a woman
 A set of indicators for education, in ve categories
 An indicator for union membership
 A set of indicators for private, government, and non-prot employer
 A constant
We use a weighted logit estimator because the purpose of estimation is to describe the
responses, not estimate underlying parameters. We use the resulting logit model to make
statements about responses in dierent subsets of the population.
We experimented with additional right-hand variables, including years of work experi-
ence, but found only small variations in estimated probabilities for groups dened by these
variables.
We consider a base case: individual not African-American, not Latino or Latina, a man,
high-school education but no college, not a union member, and working for a private em-
ployer. We display the results as probabilities of a yes answer for alternative groups from the
11base case involving only one of the indicator variables at a time. The logit model permits
calculations of estimated probabilities for any combination of the characteristics.
5.2 Evidence about the Relative Importance of Wage Posting and
Bargaining
Table 1 describes the answers to the question, \At the time that you were rst interviewed
for your job, did you already know exactly how much it would pay, have a pretty good idea
of how much it would pay, or have very little idea of how much it would pay if you got it?"
In the left panel, we consider the probability of the answer that the respondent knew exactly
how much it would pay. We believe that this answer would be chosen by individuals who
had applied for a job after seeing a formal description that included a committed rate of
pay. In the right-hand panel, we consider the group who responded that they knew exactly
or had a pretty good idea.
On the left, in the base case, 34 percent of the respondents in the base group reported that
they knew exactly how much the job paid before the employer learned about the respondent.
The weighted unconditional sample mean is 31 percent. The dierence arises from the fact
that the base group is not representative of the entire sample.
On its face, this evidence suggests that nearly a third of jobs involve posted wages. We
do not push this interpretation too far, because, on the one hand, another 50 percent of the
respondents in the base group said they had a pretty good idea of what the job would pay,
and, on the other hand, job-seekers could know the wage even if it were not a committed,
posted wage. In standard bargaining models with no private information, either Nash or
alternating oer, the worker knows in advance what wage will result from bargaining.
The left panel of Table 1 shows that an African-American worker otherwise in the base
group has a somewhat lower likelihood, 30 percent, of knowing the pay in advance, while
a Latino or Latina has an even lower likelihood, 26 percent. Women have essentially the
same likelihood as men. The probability of knowing pay in advance falls substantially with
education. Union members and those who took government jobs report knowing the wage
exactly with substantially higher frequency.
The right panel of Table 1 tabulates the combined frequency of the two answers, \knew
exactly" and \had a pretty good idea" about wages at the time of the rst interview. In the
















Base case 34 84
African-American -0.17 30 -0.31 79
(0.36) (0.32)
Latino/a -0.37 26 -0.45 76
(0.32) (0.28)
Woman -0.08 32 -0.22 80
(0.17) (0.21)
Education
  Not HS graduate -0.16 30 0.05 84
(0.37) (0.41)
  Some college -0.16 30 0.06 84
(0.22) (0.27)
  College graduate -0.61 22 0.28 87
(0.24) (0.27)
  Professional training -0.71 20 0.41 88
(0.29) (0.34)
Union member 0.66 50 0.68 91
(0.23) (0.34)
Government job 0.68 50 0.27 87
(0.24) (0.32)




Number of observations 1368 1368
Based on response, knew pay 
exactly
Based on responses, knew pay 
exactly or had pretty good 
idea
Table 1: Probability of Knowing What the Job Would Pay
13answer, \very little idea of how much it would pay," appealed to only a minority of the
respondents. It would have been useful to suggest another response somewhere between
\exactly" and \pretty good idea." Except for a reversal of the pattern of education eects,
the dierences among respondents captured by the variables are similar. Apparently the
most educated workers are the least likely to admit they were clueless about pay when they
applied for a job.
Table 2 summarizes the responses to the question, \When you were oered your (cur-
rent/previous job), did your employer make a `take-it-or leave-it' oer or was there some bar-
gaining that took place over the pay?" The table describes the probability that a respondent
would answer that some bargaining occurred. A respondent with the base characteristics has
a probability of 35 percent of that response. As we discussed earlier, the absence of bargain-
ing implied by that response does not necessarily mean that the respondent believed that the
employer was committed to the wage oer and would not have entertained a counter-oer.
In an alternating-oer equilibrium, the job-seeker can make a counter-oer and the employer
would consider it, but the job-seeker never does, because the original oer was made with
that possibility in mind and was high enough to make a counter-oer not worth the eort.
Thus, in some ways, it is a surprise that 35 percent in the base group replied that some bar-
gaining did take place. The observed incidence of bargaining arises from departures from the
assumptions of the full-information alternating-oer bargaining game. The departures could
include private information, potentially on both sides, and biased assessments of worker and
job characteristics.
The frequency of no-bargaining responses varies substantially among job-seekers. It is
higher than the base-case level among African-Americans (42 percent) and Hispanics (44
percent). Women, at 23 percent, are rather less likely than the men in the base case to bar-
gain. The incidence of wage bargaining rises dramatically with education. Respondents with
professional education had a probability of 75 percent of a bargaining during hiring. Finally,
and not surprisingly, union members (16 percent) and government workers (20 percent) had
low propensities to report bargaining over pay.
Do employers determine and post wages prior to screening workers or do they make an
oer to a worker after screening that is, in principle, negotiable via a counter-oer? No single
question in the survey answers this important question. The results above showed that about















  Not HS graduate -0.43 26
(0.43)
  Some college 0.54 48
(0.25)
  College graduate 1.02 60
(0.24)
  Professional training 1.73 75
(0.28)
Union member -1.06 16
(0.31)
Government job -0.76 20
(0.26)




Number of observations 1321
Table 2: Probability that Some Bargaining Occurred over Pay
15viewed their pay oer as having a take-it-or-leave-it character. The left panel of Table 3
describes the respondents who said they knew the pay exactly prior to being interviewed
and that there was no bargaining over pay. The likelihood that a base-case respondent gave
these two answers is 22 percent. As an estimate of the fraction of workers whose wages were
posted, this estimate has biases in both directions. It is an underestimate if workers felt they
did not know the pay exactly, even though they were well informed. It is an overestimate
on account of workers who anticipated how bargaining would later come out, but received a
customized wage in
uenced by the employer's inability to disregard a job-seeker's counter-
oer. The essence of the posted-wage model is the employer's commitment to disregard
counter-oers.
The right-hand panel of Table 3 describes the respondents who knew the pay exactly or
had a pretty good idea about the pay, prior to the interview with the employer, and who
reported the absence of bargaining over pay. This set of estimates probably over-corrects
for the bias associated the word \exactly" in the survey question|some of the respondents
who said they had a pretty good idea probably learned quite a bit about pay when they
received their oers. Just over half of the respondents in the base group (54 percent) gave
the responses consistent with wage posting according to the more inclusive criterion in the
right-hand panel. We noted earlier that it would be useful to develop a way to ask about
advance pay knowledge somewhere between exact and pretty good knowledge.
The left-hand panel of Table 3 shows large variations across categories of workers in the
estimated incidence of wage posting based on the less inclusive criterion. African-Americans
and Hispanics face slightly lower likelihoods, at 18 percent and 16 percent. Women are higher
than the base value, at 26 percent. The incidence of wage posting declines dramatically with
education, from 19 percent for those who did not complete high school to 6 percent for those
with professional training. The higher incidence of wage posting for the least educated is
consistent with the view that a wage constrained by the minimum wage is inherently posted.
Somewhat more than 10 percent of the respondents earned the minimum wage.
At 41 percent, wage posting is far more common for union members. Similarly, govern-
ment jobs, at 43 percent, are substantially more likely to have posted pay, compared to the
base case. The logit coecients in the right-hand panel are generally similar to those in the
left-hand panel. Most of the dierence comes from the much higher constant for the more
inclusive criterion, so the probabilities on the right are roughly proportionally higher than
16those on the left.
We believe this evidence indicates a higher incidence of wage posting in the more stan-
dardized jobs available to those who have not graduated from college and the lower incidence
among college graduates and those with professional education. A nding that supports this
interpretation is that workers who reported that their workday mainly involved carrying out
short, repetitive tasks were much more likely to be in jobs classied as wage posting.
5.3 Evidence about Factors that In
uence Bargaining
Table 4 summarizes the responses to the question, \Think back to the time when your were
oered your (current/most recent) job. When you were oered this job, was it possible for
you to keep your previous job instead if you wanted to?" Our interest in this topic derives
from the value of the option to keep a current job in a bargaining setting, so we have a
particular interest in learning the frequency of the option among those who can benet from
it. The sample includes those who were not employed immediately prior to obtaining their
most recent job (coded as unable to keep their previous job). The left panel describes the
answers among all respondents and the right panel those who said that they had bargained
over pay for the new job.
Among all respondents, in the left-hand panel, the table shows that an individual in
the base category had a 39 percent chance of answering yes. Thus a substantial minority
of job-seekers has the bargaining advantage of the option of keeping an existing job. This
gure is essentially the same among the respondents who said they actually bargained for
pay in the process of taking their current jobs.
Variations from the base-case probability of retaining a previous job are relatively small,
according to Table 4. Minority members are slightly more likely to retain the option and
women slightly less likely. The likelihood of the option is a bit lower for the least educated
and a bit higher for college graduates, though just the same as in the base case for those
with graduate training. Union members are also slightly more likely to have the option of
keeping an existing job.
A reasonable summary of these ndings is that among workers in general and among
those who bargained for their current pay, about 39 percent had the option of staying at
their earlier jobs. Note that the fraction of job-seekers with the option is necessarily higher

















Base case 22 54
African-American -0.26 18 -0.36 45
(0.45) (0.33)
Latino/a -0.42 16 -0.39 44
(0.40) (0.27)
Woman 0.22 26 0.42 64
(0.20) (0.16)
Education
  Not HS graduate -0.18 19 0.06 55
(0.44) (0.36)
  Some college -0.32 17 -0.36 45
(0.25) (0.22)
  College graduate -0.82 11 -0.73 36
(0.25) (0.23)
  Professional training -1.45 6 -1.25 25
(0.36) (0.26)
Union member 0.90 41 1.04 77
(0.26) (0.28)
Government job 1.00 43 0.58 68
(0.28) (0.24)




Number of observations 1317 1317
Based on response, knew 
pay exactly
Based on response, knew 
pay exactly or had pretty 
good idea
Table 3: Probability of Wage Posting under Two Criteria
18new job was not as desirable as their existing job and therefore remained at the job despite
receiving another oer. Our framework focused on the beginning of the current or most
recent job and did not inquire about job oers received in the course of that job.
Table 5 describes the answer to the question, \Did your [current/most recent] employer
learn how much you were making in your previous job before making you your job oer?"
Knowledge of earlier pay is useful to the employer in cases where the wage is not posted and
therefore committed prior to learning about the worker. The left panel reports probabilities
for the entire sample. The likelihood of a yes answer is 53 percent in the base case . Respon-
dents with other characteristics varied only a small amount from this value. As expected,
employers learned earlier pay less frequently for union members and for government jobs,
but the dierence is small.
The middle panel of Table 5 considers a group for whom the employer has more to gain
from learning earlier earnings, those seeking jobs from employers who bargain. Although
employer knowledge of earlier pay is more common in that group, the dierence is small.
Knowledge of earlier pay is particularly valuable for a worker who has the option of
remaining at the job with that rate of pay. An employer would like to make a wage oer
just enough to attract the worker from that job but not over-pay. The right-hand panel of
Table 5 shows that there is no meaningful dierence between workers who had the option
and those who did not.
The nding that many employers made an eort to learn earlier pay rates gives some
support to the hypothesis that wage posting is not the dominant mode of wage formation.
6 Conclusions
The two leading models of individual wage formation are both important in the labor market
of the United States. Between a quarter and a half of workers hold jobs that were lled with
posted wages. Jobs held by women and by people with little education are more likely to
have been posted-wage positions. College graduates and those with professional training
are rather unlikely to hold posted-wage jobs. Posted wage jobs are also common in the
government and union sector.
The evidence suggests that most of the remaining workers do not face posted wages but
could make a counteroer that an employer could not resist considering. About a third of















Base case 39 40
African-American 0.27 46 0.38 49
(0.29) (0.49)
Latino/a 0.08 41 0.17 44
(0.25) (0.40)
Woman -0.09 37 -0.19 35
(0.16) (0.25)
Education
  Not HS graduate -0.01 39 0.30 47
(0.35) (0.75)
  Some college 0.13 43 0.16 44
(0.21) (0.42)
  College graduate 0.20 44 0.31 48
(0.22) (0.41)
  Professional training 0.01 39 0.11 42
(0.25) (0.43)
Union member 0.30 47 -0.34 32
(0.22) (0.49)
Government job -0.13 36 0.21 45
(0.22) (0.39)




Number of observations 1362 469
All respondents
Respondents who bargained 
for pay






















Base case 53 64 54
African-American -0.48 42 0.08 66 -0.74 34
(0.31) (0.56) (0.40)
Latino/a -0.04 53 -0.44 54 -0.12 51
(0.25) (0.38) (0.37)
Woman 0.05 55 -0.17 61 0.20 60
(0.16) (0.26) (0.24)
Education 64 54
  Not HS graduate -0.27 47 -0.99 40 -0.20 48
(0.36) (0.73) (0.53)
  Some college -0.26 47 -0.42 54 0.02 55
(0.22) (0.42) (0.32)
  College graduate -0.17 49 -0.46 53 0.22 61
(0.22) (0.41) (0.33)
  Professional 0.01 54 -0.08 63 0.25 62
(0.26) (0.43) (0.39)
Union member -0.21 48 0.54 76 -0.14 50
(0.23) (0.52) (0.32)
Government job -0.28 46 0.01 65 -0.47 41
(0.23) (0.39) (0.32)
Non-profit job -0.03 53 -0.18 60 -0.14 50
(0.22) (0.40) (0.33)






Respondents who bargained 
for pay
Respondents who could have 
kept previous job
Table 5: Probability that the Employer Learned Previous Pay before Making Job Oer
21that a fair number of others could have made a counteroer, but employers, recognizing that
possibility, make a satisfactory initial oer.
Wage-formation theory emphasizes the importance of the option that a job-seeker may
have to retain a current job. The option is powerful in forcing a prospective employer to bid
high to hire the worker. We nd that 39 percent of workers in the base group had this option
when they took their current jobs. This estimate is higher than some earlier ones based on
data on 
ows in the labor market. On-the-job search is a central feature of the U.S. labor
market.
Finally, we nd that about half of workers report that their new employers learned the
workers' earlier pay rates before making them job oers. Employer interest in earlier pay is
an indication against wage posting. Employers presumably use the information to formulate
a satisfactory oer to workers who retain the option on earlier jobs. The information is not
suciently widespread and employers are unable to commit to ignore counteroers, else the
U.S. labor market would suer from the Diamond paradox. Instead, many workers appear
to earn substantial Ricardian rents.
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